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Autonomy
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and

Yemen

Secondhand
Arab

Oil

dependency

republic

Sheila Carapico
Recent SCHOLARSHIPON STATEAUTONOMYin theThirdWorldhas been
influenced
by thedependencythesisthatcapitalaccumulationat thecoreofthe
world economyis associatedwitheconomicunderdevelopment
and political
dependencyat theperiphery.
Dependencyreasoningis rootedin a devastating
empiricalcritiqueof the once prevalentmodernizationparadigm,in which
national state policy was the centralindependentvariable. Accordingto
dependencytheory,peripheralnations'subordinatestructural
positionsin the
internationalpolitical economyresultsin sacrificeof authoritativepolicyor
and institutions
bankers,experts,governments,
makingto foreigninvestors,
theirlocal counterparts.
Typicallyspecializingin primarycommodityexports,
fellintoa viciouscycleof deficits,debt,and fiscal
dependentnationstherefore
crisisthatworsenswheneverthepriceoftheirprimecommodity
exportfells.
and politicalleverageof
Duringthe1970stheconsiderablematerialaffluence
oil producersand even theirneighborsseemedto ensureagainstthisscenario.
Whiledependencytheoristswroteabout Latin Americaand Africa,relatively
few Arabiststurnedto world systemstheoryto explain phenomena,tradia prismofcultureand custom.The mid-1980s'declinein
tionallyviewedthrough
petroleumprices,however,has revealedtheArabianPeninsulaand theMiddle
Easterneconomyas a whole to be as vulnerableto the vicissitudesof global
marketsas itspeasantsand herdersoncewereto theweather.
Mostnationsaretiedintoa worldeconomyand susceptibleto externalmarket
forces;but the complexinterdependencies
among the core NorthAmerican,
fromthevulnerability
of
significantly
European,and theAsianeconomiesdiffer
peripheralstates,especiallyoil importers.Whereasthe conceptof autonomy
("therelativeautonomyof the state")is definedforcore nationsas the state's
independencefromthe overridinginfluenceof one domesticclass, faction,or
thecentralquestionis whetherthe stateis freefrom
coalition,in theperiphery
it can, indeed, make and execute
overwhelmingexternalinfluence-whether
domesticpoliticaland economicdecisionsautonomously
fromforeigninvestors,
n theperiphery,
bothstateautonomy(from
or markets.1
creditors,
governments,
or otherinternalclass interests)
and nationalautonomy
landowners,exporters,
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are realissues on thedebatedagenda.
(fromforcesin theexternalenvironment)
A third,complicating
issue concernsthehegemonyofthestate,theextentofits
to allocate values withinits
rulingauthority,and its abilityauthoritatively
territory.
The mostseriouscriticism
ofdependencytheoryis thatitpointsto questionsof
how internal politics and class formationinfluence national and state
autonomy,but failsto seriouslyengagethesequestions,apartfromnotingthat
evenwithinnationsthereis a centerofpowerand accumulation
and a periphery
whose
resources
the
core
either
its
draws,
upon
by exporting productsor by
whose
labor
subsistence
it
does
not
utilizing
provide.Bylocatingthedynamicof
in
the
fromthe
basic
dependency foreignexchange,
paradigmdivertsattention
domestic
the
and
state,
classes,
complexrelationshipamong
foreignpowers,
thusrelegatingordinarypoliticsto thebackground.
Part of the difficultyand debate stems fromthe failureto analytically
separateand definenationalautonomyand stateautonomy.Each of thesetwo
variables is operationalonly when a priorconditionhas been met.National
autonomyis at issue only forsystemsintegratedinto world markets,thatis,
nationsthathave gone beyondpre-capitalist
autarky.Similarly,the question
of state autonomypertainsonly where the state possesses a fairdegree of
hegemony over the society, indicated by its capacity to authoritatively
allocateresourcesforprojects.Once thisconditionhas been met,thequestionof
whetherthe stateis settingits own agenda or implementing
the interestsof a
comes
into
class
particular
play.
In the Latin Americanexamples on which dependencyanalysis is based,
nationsare well integratedinto the world economyand statespossess a fair
degreeof internalhegemony.Neitherthe statenorthe nationis autonomous,
domesticand foreigninterests,
in coalition,moldthe
however;on thecontrary,
and
allocation
of
resources
on
their
own, joint,behalf.Even
appropriation
this
is
correct
a
of
certain
are
cases, otherconfigurations
assuming
analysis
These
include
situations
in
which
the nation is but partially
possible.
integratedinto the world system,or the statepossesses incompletehegemony
overthehinterland,
or theclass situationis poorlydefined,or anycombination
thereof.In othercases, integration,
are fairly
hegemony,and class formation
but
the
state
in
complete
manages, one way or another,to steer a course
autonomousfromeitheror bothdomesticand foreignclass interests.
Wherethe
statepossessesneitherhegemonynornationalautonomy,
itappears"suspended"
above societyand is not likelyto have a firmclass basis. Finally,a strong
national class, whetherfeudal or bourgeois, shares the state's interestin
hegemonyand mayin certaininstancesfavornationalautonomy.
For the major oil-exporters'poor cousins,3the cycle of expansion and
contractionin the regionaleconomyfurthered
capitalistand statepenetration
into even rural and frontierterritoryto the point where both national
and stateautonomy
autonomyfromforeigndonors,lenders,and tradepartners,
fromindigenouscapitalistclasses,becameissues. At thispoint,thequestionis
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not simplywhether"thestate-thatis, public officialswritlarge-[is] acting
theminto public policy,"or "its
translating
upon its own policypreferences,
authoritativeactions [are] shaped and constrainedby the expectations,
demands,and pressures"of domesticclassesor foreignactors.4Also at issue is
whether
thestatedefinesitsown interests
fromdominantinternal
autonomously
concerns.
orexternal
The Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), a small, nominallycapitalist,Western
soils and temperateclimatemakeit
leaningbut nonalignednationwhosefertile
home to half the populationof the ArabianPeninsula,is in many ways an
exceptional case for dependency theory. Until the 1962 revolution, a
formof autonomyservedtheinterests
of a dominant
reactionary,
pre-capitalist
with
the
The
revolution
class
imamate.
closely aligned
tribute-collecting
but
the
rise
underminedrent-and tribute-collecting
fallof oil
and
authority,
the
the
state,
struggleamong
prices,experiencedsecondhand,heightened
domesticforces,
and foreign
powersforcontrolovertheallocationofresourcesfor
development
projects.
Precapitalist autonomy
The YAR is a young state in an old nation.Oftencalled NorthYemen to
distinguishit fromits sisterstate,the People's DemocraticRepublicof South
BritishProtectorate),
theYAR was bornof violent
Yemen(thePDRY, a former
in the Arab
revolutionin the mostisolatedand undevelopedsocial formation
world.Afterthe declineof the Ottomans,an obscurantistdynastyof imams
and autocratically
avoided externalcontacts,sealingthekingdom
xenophobicly
fromEuropeanpenetrationat popular expense.Prohibitedfromengagingin
foreigntrade,mosthouseholdswere tied to the land as grainand livestock
and householdgoods at weeklysuqsor
food,implements,
exchanging
producers,
markets.
Standard developmentindicatorsin 1962 showed widespread poverty,
ignorance,and disease. Per capita annual incomewas estimatedat U.S. $60.
About10 percentofboysand 1 percentofgirlswerein school,and adultliteracy
atbirthwas only36 years,and sixoutoften
was about3 percent.Lifeexpectancy
childrendied beforetheirfifth
birthday.Smallpox,leprosy,and tuberculosis
were water-borne
were endemic.Even moredebilitating
parasites,dysentery,
frompregnancy
and childbirth.
Therewereno paved roadsor
and complications
systems,so annual energyconsumptionper capita was only the
electricity
equivalentof sevenkilogramsofoil; veryfewhouseholdshad uncontaminated
radioswererareindeed.Threesecondaryschools
sourcesofwater,and transistor
the latteroften
traineda selectcadre of futureofficialsand militaryofficers,
drawnfromlow-statusgroupsto minimizetheirpotentialpoliticalfollowing.
ofthe
tomonopolyconcessionsgrantedto members
Foreigntradewas restricted
So
limited
with
of
merchants.
in
a
handful
favored
rulingfamily partnership
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was trade that there was no need to establisha national currency;what
exchangescould notbe agreedupon bybarterutilizeda silverthalerof Austrian
origin.Therewereno banksor publicsourcesofcreditsave a Saudi branchoffice.
A fewItaliansand otherEuropeanstradedthroughtheNorthYemeniRed Sea
portofHodeidah,buttherewereno foreign
corporations.
In this pre-capitalistenclave, a dominant tribute-collecting
mode of
in
the
coexisted
with
communala
imamate,
production,organizedpolitically
subsistence
in thetribes.Themajorclassgroupswere
mode,orgainzedpolitically
therefore(l)tributecollectors,expeciallytax farmersand landlordsbut also
whose controloftheuse offorceenabledthemto extractand
statefunctionaries,
redistribute
among themselvessurplusesproducedby the farmingmajority;
and contract
who,dependingon environmental
conditions,
(2)sharecroppers
paid
fromone- to three-quarters
of theirproduceas rentor taxes; (3)smallholders
who raisedfoodcropsand livestockforhouseholdconsumption
but werealso
to
of
taxation
and
and
subject
quartering troops;
(4)tradespeople,including
artisansand peddlers,who weredependentoritheconsumption
demandsofother
classes.A minisculefifth
class was made up of merchants,
theirprofitssecured
cotton,and importsrather
throughroyalfavorand monopolysuppliesofcoffee,
thanthroughactivetrade.Pre-revolution
Yemenwas notcharacterized
by class
in
the
twentieth
men
to
mobility,
centuryyoung
although
began escape to the
Britishportat Aden.
The statetransparently
servedthe interests
of tribute-collecting
classes,and
its power was greatestwhere landownerscollected both taxes and rents.
of land undersharecropping
reachedone hundredper centin the
Proportions
of
the
wadis
Tihama
coastal plain and on the fertile,
spate-irrigated,
tropical
of
the
terraces
western
and
temperate
especially the southern uplands,
some
estates
could
be
found
even
in irrigated
although
large
pocketsofthemore
arid
central
and
northeastern
where
smallholders
tended to
rocky,
plateau,
in
the
northern
and
central
predominate.Independentgrainfarmers,
especially
were
into
tribes
and
tribal
confederations
that
regions,
organized politically
resistedroyaladminstration
and taxation.Not justthepost-Ottoman
periodbut
centuriesofYemenihistorycouldbe summarized
as centralstates'efforts
to bribe
or brutalizethe tribes'shaykhsintosubmission,in effectto imposethetributecollectingsystem.
Even as the imamatestruggledforpoliticaland class hegemony,the system
was beingundermined
fromwithinand without.
The weakestpointswerewhere
the tributarysystemcame into contactwith externalcommercialcapital: in
between
Hodeidah, and throughclandestinecommerceand communications
in
South
and
North
Yemen's
southern
of
Ibb
Ta 'iz.
and
Aden,
Yemen,
provinces
The defectionof tradersfromthe imams'monopolisticlicensingsystem,the
migrationof thousands of smallholders,traders,tenants,and even sons of
landownersand taxcollectors,
and thepenetration
ofideologicalinfluences
from
the Ba°thto the Muslim Brotherhood
the
intothe armyand
rulingclasses,all
conspiredto destroythe semi-feudalorder.In September1962,the old imam
died in his sleep and the Palace Guard preventedhis son fromassumingthe
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throne.Withindays,theyoungrepublicbannedthemosthatedextortions
oftax
on
collectors,nationalizedthe royalfamily'sholdings,and liftedrestrictions
international
trade, investment,technology,travel,and repatriation.Soon
Yemeni riyals were minted and circulated.The main fettersto capitalist
weregone.
development
Elementsoftheancienrégimefought
back,and thecivilwar becamea regional
cAbdal-NasirdispatchedEgyptianforcesto assisttherepublicancoup
conflict.
to restoration
themselves
of the monarchy.Egypt's
whiletheSaudis committed
interestdwindledafterits 1967 defeatby Israel while Saudi attitudestoward
theYAR changedafterthe radicalanti-imperialist
revolutionin SouthYemen
(the People's DemocraticRepublicor PDRY) in 1968/69.The war in North
Yemen formallyended in 1970 with Saudi acceptance of a modernizing
republicanregimewith old royalistsin its civiliancoalition.The YAR was
indebtedto Egypt,hoped forSaudi charity,
and attractedsmall international
in thenewly
aid packages.ExpatriateArab advisorsfiguredveryprominently
ministries.
subsistence
continuedto
createdor restructured
Although
agriculture
of
climbed
while
tenant
a
and
families,imports
smallholding
support majority
exportsstagnated.
The commercial bonanza
ofoil revenuesintoneighboring
countriesoccurredas a tentative
The infusion
peace settledover the YAR's newlyliberalizedeconomy,at a timewhen the
systemhad beenbrokenbutissuesof internalpowerand
powerofthetributary
wereyetunresolved,whenpurseswerestrainedby a destructive
organization
civilwar and by a droughtin 1971/72,and when boththe Yemeniriyaland
consumergoods werepenetrating
urbanand ruralmarkets.Partofthe
imported
revenuesto the Arab Gulffoundtheirway via privatetransfersand official
in the
assistanceto Yemen,wheretheyfinancedrapid expansion,particularly
of migration
and servicessectors.The combinedeffects
construction,
transport,
led to what one teamof observerslabeled the "anomalyof a
and remittances
labor-short,capital-surplus,least-developedeconomy."5In this anomalous
situation,the mobilityand scarcityof labor,the expansionof the market,the
tended
increasedvalue of non-landedwealth,and rapidgrowthin consumption
to exacerbateunresolvedtensionsin ways thatinvolvedforeignpowersmore
deeplyin Yemeniaffairs.
to a populationof around eightmilliontopped a billion
Cash remittances
dollarsin 1979,and rose to $1.6 billiona yearin theearly1980s.These funds
werevirtuallyuntaxed,and two-thirds
remainedoutsidethe nascentbanking
the
the
of
reach
state
and formalfinancial institutions.
system,beyond
from
a
transition
Remittances
consumptionof domesticproductsto
bought
of
from
abroad.
Despitethe alarmingratio of exportsto
consumption goods
the
YAR
overall
balanceof paymentssurplus,currency
sustained
an
imports,
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paritywiththe dollar and theSaudi riyal,and nationalreservesthatwerethe
envy of mostThird World oil importersthroughoutthe 1970s. Labor was a
valuableexportcommodity.
butnowoccurred
on an
abroadwas notnewtotheYemenilaborforce,
Migration
scale. It is no mystery
whyovera millionYemenimen-abouta
unprecedented
or "onefromeveryhouse,"as villagersputit-went
thirdof themale workforce,
to Saudi Arabiaor otherGulfstatesduringtheoil boom.Internalliberalization,
mobility,and hardship all coincided with the bonanza next door. Travel
overlandwas easy, given the absenceof passportchecksuntilafter1978 and
customarylong-distancetrade,herding,marriage,and pilgrimageacross the
unmarkedborder.Jobsand pettyentrepreneurial
opportunitiesforYemenis
either working alone or for fellow villagers abounded, especially in the
weregood, and frugal
construction
sectors.Ratesof remuneration
and tertiary
livingguaranteedhighsavings.
forthedomesticeconomy.6
The exportofmale laborhad severalramifications
In thegrainfarming
cycle,someseasonallyredundantmalelaborcouldbe spared
withoutsacrificing
Beyondthispoint,however,theloss of labor
productivity.
encouraged the taking of shortcuts(such as less frequentpruning) and
abandonmentof marginalterraces(supportinga rowor two of sorghum).This
tendencywas exacerbatedby the appearanceof day labor,used especiallyfor
seasonal tasks like plowing and terracemaintenance,and the subsequent
inflationin its cost. Eventually,farmhands became so expensive(unskilled,
to benefittenants,
aboutYR 50 or $11 perday) thatcropshareswererenegotiated
and high labor costs discouragedlarge and intermediate-scale
farmersfrom
intensifying
production.WithoverallGDP growthat 8 per cent per annum,
on the farmslid from
agriculturestagnated.The proportionof the workforce
near90 per centon theeve oftherevolution
to 78 percentin 1975and less than
halfin theearly1980s.The highestpercentageincreaseswerein construction
(25
(10 per
percent),tradeand finance(60 percent),and miningand manufacturing
cent).Yet theWorldBankestimatedan additional38,000workerswereneeded
at all levels.
Loss of labor was only half the story.The otherhalf was the flood of
whichin practicemeantgoods as well as cash.Beforeturning
to the
remittances,
of
how
modified
of
remittances
overall
question
patterns consumptionand
it
is
to
of
especiallyinvestments,
important map the formsand distribution
remittances.
were
in
three
forms.
and
transmitted
back
First,it
Wages
profits
was business-wiseto purchaseconsumeritemsin theGulf.Migrants
boughtand
loaded a pickupor tractor-trailer
truckwithgoods fortheirfamiliesand to sell,
typicallywith a mind to using the vehicle to generatefutureincome.Many
made regularroundtrips,bearinggoods purchasedcheaplyintothe
"migrants"
YAR and returningnorth with passengers and occasionally livestock or
watermelons.
Onlytowardtheend oftheperioddid theYAR government
begin
to taxthistradeand curbsmuggling.
fundsforlongerterm
Secondly,remittanceagents and traderstransferred
in
with
instructions
forstipendsback
Saudi
Arabia
migrants,
acceptingdeposits
or
investments
in urbanreal
of
and
home,purchase
storage buildingmaterials,
and
estate.Agentsthusperformed
a rangeoffinancialservices,fora commission,
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elementin theemerging
an important
represented
bourgeoisie.A handfulofbig
the
market
made
vast
fortunes,while a much
moneychangers
dominating
number
of
smaller
agentshandsomelysupplementedincomesfrom
greater
or
other
activities.
shopkeeping
traveledhomewiththousands,sometimestensofthousands
Lastly,migrants
in theirbelts.This cash,like
ofdollars'worthof Yemenior Saudi riyalsstuffed
distributed
in
number
ofways.Sons made lump
a
transfers
was
through
agents,
to theirfamilyfarmsor trades in lieu of theirwork forthe
contributions
of theirfamiliesin their
or paid debtsto providersor protectors
partnership,
absence. Bridepriceand othermarriagecosts soared to over YR 100,000(or
$22,000)in some regions,paid to thebride'sfather(thelargestshare),thebride
herself,and her women relatives.Finally,returneesspent exorbitantlyon
consumptionforthemselves,theirextendedfamilies,and theirfriends.They
boughtclothes,gold, televisions,and linoleum,builtnew roomsonto family
homes,and entertained
lavishly.Chewingthemildlynarcoticleaves of theqat
to certainhigh-elevationregions and high-income
limited
a
plant, luxury
becamea regulardailyritualforthevast majority
classesbeforetherevolution,
thanon
ofmenand manywomen.A greatdeal morewas spenton consumption
production.
The huge investment
by remittedearnings,therefore,
potentialrepresented
butdispersedamong
themselves
was notheldsolelyorevenmainlybymigrants
female
and
male
and
kin, construction
traders, fathers-in-law,
agents
So
the
in
the
sellers.
fact
that
and
contractors, qat
aggregatea portionof
does
was translatedintoprivateand collectiveformsofinvestment
remittances
not necessarilymean that it was individualmigrantswho were doing the
Indeed,apartfroma coupleofagents,thisaggregatespendingpower
investing.7
was verywidelydispersed.
services.
was in distributive
The mostcommonformof collectiveinvestment
in
were
water
and
electrification,particular,
Roads,
necessaryto get
delivery,
with
televisions
machines
to
and
laden
mountaintopvillages.
Toyotas
washing
of rough,bulldozerAt least60 per centofthecostsof some 15,000kilometers
collection
dozens
hundreds
of
water
and
hewnmountain
tracks,
deliveryprojects,
of
scores
electrical
and
of neighborhood,
and
town,
generators,
primary
village
schoolbuildingsand clinics,werebornein ad hoc fashionby
and intermediate
townspeopleand traders,migrantsand farmers,and
agentsand merchants,
donors.8
Thistypeofexpenditure
the
and foreign
sometimes government
figured
domestic
formation.
These services,in turn,
in
capital
prominently overall
in outlying
bothcommerce
and thepowerofthecentralgovernment
strengthened
for
areas,and greatlyexpandedopportunities entrepreneurship.
Collectiveinvestmentsrarelygeneratedincome directly;rather,theylaid
The vast majorityof all farmand business
thebasis forprivateinvestments.
were undertakenby individualsand families.Most were small
investments
scale:a 1980surveyby theCentralPlanningOrganizationshowed onlysixtyforexample,and the
withmorethantenworkers,
establishments
nineindustrial
laborforcewas overwhelmingly
organizedat thehouseholdlevel.
agricultural
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Individual investmentsoperated within a pattern of incentives and
constraintsthat favored the tertiarysector. First,to be viable in sheerly
economicterms,a domesticinvestment
should promisereturnscomparableto
what could be made in Saudi Arabia. Beyond this, the twin pressuresof
inflationand scarcelabor favoredspeculationstocksof importsor urbanreal
estateeven as the same inflationclosed theseoptionsto new small investors.
Pettyshopkeepingand serviceslike drivingor graingrindingconsequently
became highlycompetitiveand minimallyprofitable.For the skilled,smallindustriessuchas carpentry,
scale construction-related
metaldoor manufacture,
Yemeniarchedstained-glasswindowswere good
and productionof distinctly
investments.
In agriculture,the potential for investmentsin tractorsand irrigation
technologywas limitedfirstby thegenerallymountainousterrainand terrace
cultivationand secondlyby the limitednumberof contiguousholdingsof a
ofhired
hectareor two. Such innovationsalso generallyinvolveda substitution
for imputed (family) or fixed-share(tenant) labor. The most lucrative
agriculturalcommodityin thelate 1970swas thehardy,undemanding,highly
marketable
qat,grownonlyat certainelevationsand servinga domesticmarket;
other cash crops like cotton,dates, coffee,and tobacco sufferedfromthe
competitionof imports.The most attractivesectorsforprivateinvestment,
therefore,were wholesale or retail trade in imports or qat, related
and services,and therealestateand construction
sectors.
transportation
Whileremittances
were thesource,director indirect,
of mostprivatecapital,
foreigndonors underwrotethe state.Externalloans,grants,and directproject
assistanceaccountedforoverthree-quarters
of government
in the
expenditures
1976-81period.10The Saudis and otherGulf"petrocracies"
had everyincentive
to be generousto the YAR- neighbor,labor-supplier,
excess capital absorber,
bulwark
the
communist
in SouthYemen.
menace
potentialbreadbasket,
against
or
infrastructure
financed
Importantgovernment
by Arab oil
partly wholly
revenuesincluded stringsof stoneschool buildings,the Universityof Sana'a
Arabteachers;direct
campus,and salariesfortensof thousandsof non-Yemeni
subsidiesbothto theYAR centralbudgetand to therecalcitrant
northern
tribes;
and
other
medical
a
facilities; complete national color
major hospitals
televisionstation;restoration
of theancientMaribdam to operatingorder;two
north-south
paved
highways; technicalplanning assistance; and so forth.
DirectbilateralassistancecombinedwithArab and international
development
fundsto totalbillionsof dollarsforsocial and economicinfrastructure,
favoring
the fivemain towns but not entirelyneglectingprovincialcentersand rural
areas.
The oil boom also attractedotherinternational
donorsto theYAR,theclosest
and economicallyindispensableArab Gulf.
"needy"nationto the strategically
Hence along withthe petrodollarscame loans,grants,technicalpersonnel,and
scholarshipsfromnearly every Westernand socialist donor. For example,
Egyptian,Sudanese,Russian,Chinese,German,Swedish,Norwegian,American,
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Italian, French,Irish, and other nationalities' doctors and nurses treated
Yemenipatients.The WorldBanktooka lead in designingand financing
major
the
projects,and theUnitedNationsorganizations,
regionaland infrastructural
ArabDevelopmentFund,and othermultilateral
also
an
active
agencies
played
role.TheFederalRepublicofGermanywas thelargestnon-Arabdonor,followed
to undertake
by theUSSR. Overall,foreignassistanceenabledthegovernment
construction
coordinated
services
and
ambitious
thoughpoorly
programs.
fromcurrent
combinedwith
In short,then,remittances
and previousmigrants
new
to
forms
of
investment:
several
assistance
generate
large-scale,
foreign
smaller-scale,collectivelyfinancedservices;
state-sponsoredinfrastructure;
some majorand countlessminortrading,transport,
and light
construction,
industrialsector enterprises;and unprecedentedmarketingof imported
manufactures
and food.Massive externalfinancing
promotedthe urban-based
boombothdirectly
intheformofcontracts
forroads,airports,
construction
public
the
other
in
formof demand for
and
and
facilities,
indirectly
buildings,
werefueling
workers.Ifremittances
residencesforAraband Westernexpatriate
the"downscale"end ofbothdemandand construction,
assistance
international
or
was financing
large "upscale"projects.
The influxof privateand public funds,an explodingdomesticmarket,and
urbanexpansiontogetherluredstillanothersourceof capital.What
fast-paced
be
theabsenteebourgeoisie,
thesonsand daughtersofYemeniswho
called
might
had migratedto Aden, East Africa,Asia, Europe, and Americabeforethe
to Yemenas revolutions
revolution,
began"returning"
swepttheirnew homesor
the
of
in
Yemeni
because
economy.ManyAdenis,North
simply
rapidgrowth
or
all
and
half-Yemenis
Yemenis,
repatriated
part of businesses such as
or
or
or
auto
travel
currency
dealerships
exchanges;othersinvestedin
equipment
Yemeni real estate,construction,
or modernrestaurantsand supermarkets.
Anothersegmentof thisgroupbroughtfluencyin technocratic
Englishto high
the
in
influencewere
in
new
ministries.
in
number
but
smaller
positions
Larger
thosewho parlayedmechanical,office,or linguisticskillsinto"modern"sector
fromVietnamand East Africa(imwelcome
jobs.Finally,refugeesand emigrants
in Saudi Arabia)formedthecoreofa new workingclass of factory
workersand
householdservants.
The transfer
ofvast sumsintoa smalleconomyalso hastenedand molded a
of
class
transformation
alreadybegunwhentheinnercircleof theold
process
Absentee
businessmenand intellectualsjoined agentaristocracycollapsed.
lone
a
industrial
banker-traders,
magnate,some old monopolists,certain
the
owners
of farmlandsituatedforsale as urbanreal
landowners,and
happy
in
the
commercial
estate
bourgeoisie.Pettytrade and
emerging,primarily
becamepopularoccupations,
restauranteuring,
despisedbeforetherevolution,
and merchantsearned new respect. Migrationwas the avenue for poor
smallholders,sharecroppers,and artisans to enter the ranks of the selffreedtenants,marginal
employedpettybourgeoisie,but failedentrepreneurs,
constituted
a smalland growingwage-labor
and pooremigrants
smallholders,
force.The mobilityof labor,unprecedentedvalue of non-landedwealth,and
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changes in taxation,services,and commerceall challenged existingsocial
relations.
Economicexpansion and class realignmententailed struggle,particularly
betweendecliningagrarianelitesand risingcommercialclasses. Especiallyin
the southernand central regions, the effortsof republican officersand
merchantsand peddlers,coffeeand qat growers,and migrants
administrators,
to cut roads or divertirrigation
and truck-owners
waterforhouseholdsupplies
metwithresistancefromlandlords,who blockedbulldozers,intimidated
work
crewsand broughtlengthylegal,bureaucratic,
and politicalsuits.Competition
or clans foraccessto projectstooktheformofcontestsand
amongcommunities
over
wars
road
tiny
alignments,waterutilization,generatorownership,and
school or hospital locations.Many innovationscomplicatedgenerations-old
claimsto water,land,and markets.
FromSana'a, a successionof regimesfoughtto securethestate'stax base, its
and its legal authority.The forcesresistingthe statewere diverse.
frontiers,
Most cases containedelementsof a tax revolt,and manyregionsconditioned
loyaltyon the provisionof servicesand otherbenefits.The Hashid and Bakil
tribesof the northand east,while hardly"traditional"
whenit came to market
to centralauthority
tribal
law
as
a
viable
alternative
participation,
presented
and chargedthatgovernment
the
more
favored
southernand
projects
productive
coastal regions.The Sunni Shafacisof these regionscounterallegedthatthe
as muchas theimamicsystembeforeit,represented
the
republicangovernment,
ShiiteZaydi sect of the northernand centralhighlands.When strugglesby
of farmers,
communities
tradespeople,and migrantsforaccess to new services
faced feudal intransigence,
on the one hand, or the preferredstandingof a
wealthierrivalcommunity,
on theother,thesestrugglessometimesassociated
overtlywith the loosely organized progressivemovementknown as the
NationalDemocraticFront(NDF) or simply"thefront."
These conditionswere
in
those
southern
and
districts
wheretraditional
central
especiallyprevalent
landowners'authority
remainedstrong.
One oftheNDF s positionswas supportforunity,orat leastclosercooperation,
with South Yemen. Not only the small political leftbut also, in varying
degrees,people in the southernuplands and Tihama, familieswith kin or
personaltiesto theSouth,and manyeducatednationalists
arguedthata single
nationwithcoastson two seas and combinedbudgetswouldbe moreviablethan
two states.This positionwas made somewhattenableat thegovernmental
level
the
fact
Southern
that
held
in
the
natives
did
as
YAR,
by
high positions
Northerners
in thePDRY. Butit was vigorouslyopposedby manyreligiousand
economicconservatives,some merchantswho had fledthe revolutionin the
South, northernYAR regional interestsfearinga southward shiftin the
nationalcenterof politicalgravity,and mostespeciallyby theSaudis.
As its greatestbenefactor,
Saudi Arabiawieldedconsiderableand sometimes
influence
over
the
YAR. After1970Riyadhabandonedtheroyalist
paradoxical
cause in favor of molding a friendlyrepublicanregimethroughbilateral
with
assistance,subsidiesto bothtribaland rightist
elements,and negotiations
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the United States on behalf of the YAR and against the PDRY. Massive
budgetarysupportensureda say in policy,as in thefieldof education,where
librariesclosed forprayer,classes were segregatedby sex, and at
university
students.Religious
leastone unveiledwoman was stonedby fundamentalist
booksstressing
a
some
and
secular
institutes
schools,
history
community
replaced
commonlegacy with South Yemen were revised. Cash grantsto both the
and the fundamentalist
"Islamic
Hashid and Bakil confederations
recalcitrant
and domesticprogressives.All of
Front"fortified
resistanceto the government
thesepolicieswere just slightlycontradictory,
pushingmodernizationwitha
face
and
powerwithindefinitelimits.
reactionary
fostering
government
The Saudis were now likened to the Egyptiansa decade earlier. It was
thattheirbroadcastnewsmaps showedno southernborder,and that
remarked
had been annexed by the Kingdom.
this or that narrowstretchof frontier
of Presidental-Hamdi on the eve
in
the
assassination
was
Riyadh
implicated
ofa statevisitto Aden,and in boththechoiceand theremovalofhis successor.
The considerableinfluenceof the Yemeni-SaudiCoordinatingCommitteein
domesticas well as foreignpolicy was a source of irritation,as was the
American
sale ofarmsto YementhroughRiyadhin 1976.
The year of two assassinations,1977/78,was the nadir of statepower. As
tribeswerein revolt. In thecentraland southern
usual,manyof thenorthern
Front
"tookover" a dozen or two districts,getting
the
National
highlands
services
into
sympathizers locallyresponsiblepositions,organizingcommunity
The amy,backed by
and roads,evadingtaxes,and defyingcentralauthority.
some tribalcontingents,counterattacked,
driving some rebels into PDRY
of
the
southernhalfof the YAR was in
New
much
Year's,1979,
By
territory.
PDRY
forces
were
on alert.The Saudis worriedlest
Soviet-trained
and
turmoil,
movementpenetrate
thekingdomvia migration,
theprogressive
bringan NDFto
or
their
of
in
objective unitingthetwo
inspiredgovernment power Sana'a, gain
Yemens.
Thoughlargelyunrelated,theseeventscoincidedwiththe Iranianrevolution
and withAraboppositionto Camp David,thuscomingat a timewhenRiyadh
was especially vital to Western securityand oil supply interests.This
confluenceof events attractedunusual U.S. official,press, and scholarly
attentionto Saudi securityconcerns,notablysurroundingevents in Yemen.
Following Defense SecretaryBrown's visit with Prince Fahd, the Carter
administrationhastily ordered some $300 million worth of F-5 fighters,
armoredpersonnelcarriers,tanks,howitzers,and lightweapons forsale to
Vulcan anti-aircraft
Sana'a via the Saudis; and a shipmentof fire-spitting
weapons,promisedin 1976,was dispatchedimmediatelyalong withtrainers
and advisors.As the fightingescalated,Saudi troopswent on alert,and the
WhiteHouse respondedwith a show of militaryforcein the Arabian Gulf,
forcovertoperationsbased in
another$100millionin arms,and authorization
NorthYemenagainstthePDRY.12
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Through this deal the Saudis regulatedYemeni access to the weapons,
relationswiththeSoviets,thePDRY,
amongotherthingson limiting
contingent
Saudi rolein NorthYemenidomestic
and Libya,and guaranteeda stillstronger
of Yemen
implicitAmericanrecognition
politics.The armspackageconstituted
as a clientstateof Saudi Arabia,and Yemeniofficialsand citizenscomplained
of Washington's
failureto deal withtheYAR as a sovereignstate.
into
theYAR had becomeintegrated
Thus bothpoliticallyand economically,
the global politicaleconomyas a dependencyof Saudi Arabia.Saudi control
but
withtheUSSR weresoontounderscore,
was notabsolute,as newagreements
there was no significantpolicy sphere-trade, finance,education,internal
security,
foreignpolicy-in whichtheYemenistatewas genuinelyautonomous
fromits northern
neighbor.This highdegreeof externaldependencycoincided
elevenprovincesas Sana'a
withnearanarchyin morethanhalfofthecountry's
faced not one but multipleinsurrectionsand a virtualcollapse of national
taxationduringtheperiod1977through1982.
The down side of the cycle
Between1982 and 1985, the combinedoil exportrevenuesof Saudi Arabia,
Kuwait,and theUnitedArabEmiratesslid fromover$180billionto under$60
intotheYAR fellfrom$1.4
billion.Duringthesame fouryears,privatetransfers
billion to $.6 billion. Althoughthe YAR remaineda priorityin the Gulfs
sharplyreducedforeignassistancebudgets,thedays ofuncheckedlargessewere
gone. Thus the two major supplies of hard cash to the YAR economywere
curtailed.Yet,as in the Gulfitself,therewas no returnto the situationbefore
theboom,becausewhilerevenuesheldconstantor declined,manyexpenditures
continuedto climb.At boththe nationaland thehouseholdlevels,it costmore
and moreto maintainthestandardsand expectations
tastedduringthebonanza.
and services,verylittleof
Despite progresson necessary,basic infrastructure
the cash "surplus"of the 1970shad led to productivesubstitutes
formigration
The government
and importation.
had been ill equipped to directinvestments,
and privateinvestorsfoundspeculationin importsand real estategenerally
morelucrativethanagriculture
The resultswerefeltin the1980s.
and industry.
The moneyand waterspentin agricultural
and manufacturing
had
development
or hard currencyreturns,and
yet to be justifiedin termsof eithernutritional
equipment,fuel,and raw materialsall came fromabroad. Whileits GNP per
$550 a year,deficits,
debts,and
capita now restedat a moderatelycomfortable
castlongshadowsovertheeconomy.
underproductivity
Ratesof new migrationpeaked in thelate 1970sbutnumbersremainedfairly
highthroughthe mid-1980sbecause the Arab Gulfeconomiesstillseemedto
offeropportunities
forearningsand savingsthatcomparedfavorablyto those
availableat home.But new migrants,
findingthesmallernumbersofjobs filled
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homeafteronlyeightor
byAsiansaccustomedto low wages,now oftenreturned
ninemonthswithfarmoremodestsavingsthantheirpredecessors.
AssistancefromIraq driedup due
External
financing
changedhandsand forms.
but
toitswarwithIran.The oil kingdomscontinuedto pay forexistingprograms
Muchofthedifference
was made up by new
curtailednew grantcommitments.
Araband international
loans,fundsfromEastand WestEuropeand China,and
disasterreliefafterthe 1983earthquakein Dhamar.In the meantime,however,
earliernotescame due; some were rescheduled;moreloans were taken.The
assistancedeclined,and forthe
spendingpower representedby international
resortedto privateborrowing.
timethegovernment
first
DespitesteadyGNP growthfora decade,domesticproductionwas lagging.
ofall
laborforce,per centof GDP fromagriculture,
The agriculture
proportion
in the farmsector,share of nationaland familydiets produced
investment
locally,agricultural
exports,and overallfoodproductionall continuedto drop.
Localized gains on newly pump-irrigated
holdings and the importationof
foodproductionwas lower
fertilizer
and
equipmentnotwithstanding,
expensive
in the mid-1980sthanit had been a decade earlier,while cereal importshad
increasedmore than fourfold.In addition,especially as long as the riyal
retainedparitywiththe dollar,domesticproducersof Yemeni dates, coffee,
cotton,tobacco,eggs, chickens,nuts, fruits,and oils all sufferedfromthe
marketed.Food and live
competitionof cheaper importsmore efficiently
animalsrepresented30 per centof importsinto a stillprimarilyagricultural
economy.
threatened
and farmopportunities
Withmigration
unemployment
tightening,
Acute
labor-short
a formerly
economy.
among throngsof drivers,
competition
even
and
gas-stationowners minimizedtheir
shopkeepers,graingrinders,
additionsto the statepayrollforthe
still
annual
brisk,
fairly
Though
profits.
and maintenancestaffs
and
office
health,
workers,
engineering,
teaching,
army,
failedto pick up the slack, partlybecause foreignersfilledso many skilled
positions.No transnationalcorporateemployerswere drawn to the Yemeni
market,for the labor forcewas unskilledand expensive by international
contractors
standards.Chineseand Koreanroad construction
broughttheirown
crews. Several thousand new jobs in public and private factories
or the
mostnew"modernsector"jobs fedeitherthegovernment
notwithstanding,
And yetthereremainedacuteshortagesof skilledpersonnel.
tradedeficits.
Earningsremainedconstantwhile inflationeroded spending power. The
standardtaxi fareof YR 15-20betweenlocationsin Sana'a, daily wage rates
salaries around YR 1,500a month
fromYR 50-150per day, and government
in commodity
1987
1979
and
between
importsof
despiteinflation
barelychanged
25 per cent per annum. Having sacrificeda portionof the harvestto keep
on theland a decade earlier,landlordsnow demandeda returnto
sharecroppers
the statusquo ante or tookbank loans forinputsto justifyretaininga larger
share,so sharecropperincomes declined. Importedwhite wheat steadily

206

Arab Studies Quarterly

depresseddemand forthe rainfedgraincrops of the greatmajorityof small
farmers.
of importsmounted,whilethe
Household,business,and publicconsumption
value of exportsstagnated.In the early 1980s,the WorldBank figuresgrew
ominous.In 1980therewas a current
accountdeficitof$478million,and external
to
27 per cent of GNP. Still annual debt
debt
of
$836
million,
equal
public
to
of
million
a
came
$5
only.6 percentofGNP and only6 percent
year
payments
of the value of exportsof goods and services;while international
reserves,at
$1,289million,were stilladequate to coversevenmonths'imports.Threeyears
laterthe picturewas much darker.The currentaccountdeficitreached$558
million.Externalpublic debt,now $1,574millionor morethan38 per centof
GNP, requiredannual paymentsof$13 millionor 1 percentofGNP and 14 per
centofthevalue ofgoods and servicesexported.Reserves,downto $369million,
a quarterof whattheyhad been,would now coveronlytwo months'spending
abroad. In 1983, exportsof $204 millioncompared with importsof $1,521
million.
measuresbeginningwiththesecond
Balanceof tradedeficitsled to austerity
in
1982.
The
which
five-year
riyal,
duringtheboomyearshad been heldat
plan
a constant,unifiedvalue againstthe dollar of $1=YR 4.5, was devalued; and
to makedomestic
of fruitsand vegetables,were restricted
imports,particularly
more
But
deficits
produce
competitivelocally.
dipped only slightlybefore
would
further.
mid-1986
a
dollar
buy nearlytwelveriyals,and
By
worsening
morecouldbe had on theblackmarket.
In August1986,importsweretemporarily
suspended to trimthatyear's deficitand reduce consumerdemand through
higherprices. In 1987 the governmentbroughtsuit against Sana'a's biggest
themto close shop and unifying
the
/remittance
moneychangers
agents,forcing
of
the
the
10
at
9
bank
rate
and
(between
dollar).
riyal
price
riyalsper
All the while, road use and demand for schools, medical facilities,
and water pumpingschemesstillmultiplied.In twentyyears,
electrification,
crudebirthrateshad dropped6 per centand deathrates21 per centthanksin
partto over ten timesmoredoctorsand othermedicalpersonnel.A thirdof
childrenwere in primaryschool. Annual energyconsumptionwas up to the
of
equivalentof116 kilogramsofoil percapita.In citiesand towns,consumption
water
the
need
for
and
sewers
created
and
piped
packagedgoods
regulargarbage
so did government
disposal. As use of and demand forservicesmushroomed,
withrevenuesdownand expenditures
expenses.Not surprisingly,
up, ministries
couldn'tmakeends meet.By 1982thegovernment
deficithad climbedto a third
of GDP. By crackingdown on smugglingand tax evasion,the government
managed withinfiveyearsto driveits deficitbelow twentyper centof GDP,
whilethedebtserviceratiorose to aboutfifteen
percent.
As the governmentresponseto the economiccrunchindicates,its role in
economicpolicywas stronger
Salihsurvived
thanduringthebonanza.President
a difficultfirstfew years to surpass the tenure of any of his republican
predecessors,replace banditrywith check points on the nation'sroads, and
in all eleven provinces.The armygained the
establishcentraladministration
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upperhand over but did not impose defeatupon the tribesand leftistforces;
and othersintoa "national
instead,some leadersweredrawnintogovernment
Local
administration
was integrated
on
constitutional
proposals.
dialogue"
networkof cooperativedevelopmentcouncils,whose
with the multi-tiered
electionsdrewmoreand morevotersineachroundbetween1976and
nationwide
1986.Aftera fundamentalist
victoryin thesepolls in 1982,moreprogressives
and even a handfulof womenwereelectedin 1986.National
and intellectuals
shiftedfromtheYemenito theexpatriate
surveillance
community.
security
were reinforced.
One important
and complexpolicy
and
control
Legitimacy
to passportholdersand thendeniedpassportsto nonbordercrossings
restricted
veteran men, bringingsons of ministersas well as of innkeepers and
intothearmy.Illiteratesservedan extrayearin readingclasses.
sharecroppers
The draftplus additionsto thecivilserviceput thousandsof familiesintostate
insurance,purchasing,and financialprograms,while schools and training
and nationaltelevisionexposedthemto theemergingcivicculture.
facilities
Constructionof nationalinfrastructure,
generallywith foreignassistance,
Roadsand massivegovernment
centralauthority.
reinforced
complexes,and also
had
the
all helped extend
national
and
schools,hospitals,
electricity
system,
of
thephysicalpresenceof the stateto the frontier
provinces al-Bayda,Marib,
down to the
theJawf,
and Sacadah.Publicbuildingsand servicesalso penetrated
controlenabled
level.Its provisionof servicesand assertionof military
district
forlocal services,
theregimeto centralizebothtax collectionand expenditures
to undertake
the
of
communities
revenues
its
own
and
limiting autonomy
raising
were
which
often
not
as
as
a challenge
Even
local
and
regionalprojects,
projects.
buttressedstatehegemony.
at theoutset,ultimately
to centralauthority
Via migration,
remittances,
imports,wages, and services,everyhousehold
was now tied intotheriyaleconomy,and thusintotherealmmanipulatedby
in
bychangesin foreignexchange.The contraction
monetary
policyand affected
for
the
that
called
more
than
far
expansion
preceded it,
foreignexchange,
The resultwas thatforthe first
decisivestateactionto marshalinvestments.
timesince the revolutionthe governmentwas practicingeconomicpolicy as
schedule.Whilestillan open-market
policy,
opposedto pursuinga construction
of theseventies.
thiswas a markedchangefromtheextremelaissez-faire
acted againstcommercialinterestsin suspending
Althoughthe government
customstaxes,and imposingother
enforcing
closingmoneychangers,
imports,
the
interestsof the stateand those of
and
measures,by
large
austerity-linked
such
in
as education,internalsecurity,
broad
areas
coincided
thebourgeoisie
urban
development,and multilateralforeign
transportand communications,
These
assistance,as well as in specificproject-related
purchasingand contracts.
of
intereststriumphedover the motleyrange landed, leftist,fundamentalist,
in partbyco-optingthem.
and tribalforces,
Reducedfinancialand economicdependenceand greaterinternalhegemony
enabled the YAR to assertgreaterautonomyvis-à-visits northernneighbor.
Controlson smugglingand passportchecksmade economicboundariesless
permeable.Reductionsin Saudi subsidiesto the tribesand the religiousright
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eased severalpressuresand cleavagesthathad underminedtherepublicin the
1970s.Fences were mended withSouthYemen and the NDF, and unitywas
prominenton the national political agenda. While observerswere rarely
sanguine about a true mergerof the "socialist"PDRY with the "capitalist"
economicand communications
and
YAR,commontourism,
ventures,
publication
extensivediscussionofunityclausesin theconstitutional
forces
documents,
joint
sent to Lebanon during Israeli attacks,and otherformsof cooperationlong
regardedas anathemato theSaudis now symbolizedYemeninationalismand
independence.Most analystsagreedthattheYAR was successfully
playingthe
Soviets against the Saudis and plottinga relativelyindependentforeign
policy.14
In the mid-1980s,reservesof at least 500 millionbarrelsof oil, well beyond
domesticneeds,werediscoveredin theYAR's easternbasin.Contracts
withHunt
Oil led to hopes of revenuesby the 1990s,but also necessitateda halfa billion
dollars' investmentover a two-to-threeyear period, virtuallyall foreign
exchangeforpurchasesabroad.Fearfulthatbeingan oil exporterwould reduce
thecountry's
prospectsforconcessionalforeignassistance,theCentralPlanning
Organizationpointedout thateven over a ten-yearhorizonrevenueswerenot
In any case, thediscovery,and
expectedto offsetthe declinein remittances.15
evidenceof additionalreserves,put an end to planners'worstfearsabout the
futureof foreignexchange.Thoughits reserveswere smallcomparedwiththe
forthefirsttime,and
Saudis',theyput theYAR on the footingof a competitor
bothYemenisand Americansbracedformaneuversto delayorcontrolitsoil and
gas production.
In theshortrun,at least,theYAR was no less dependenton externalfinancing
to implementits domestic projects,but it was an increasinglymultilateral
and multilateral
that
dependencyon Arab,Communist,Western,
organizations
no
influence
to
one
donor
but
rather
afforded
granted
extraordinary
any
considerableleverage.The mostprominent
influencein developingthe1986-91
was
the
World
which
Bank,
five-yearplan
proposed to co-financecapitalintensiveagricultural
in thenorthern
modernization
and easternregionsalong
the linesof projectsalreadyoperatingin theTihamaand thesouthernuplands
and being executed in the centralregion.In unveilingthe plan, the Central
to
PlanningOrganizationadvisedotherdonorsthatfutureprojectsmustconform
and
else
would
be
declined.
targetedstrategies activities, they
While allocating capital to the oil sector,the third five-yearplan gave
to agriculture,
wherethe strategy
was to promotea "greenrevolution"
priority
in heretofore
semi-aridregionsby experimenting
withimportedtechnology
and
it
credit
to
cash
The
farmers.
extending through
newly completed
packages
MaribDam and a waterdevelopmentschemeforWadi al-Jawf,
bothin theeast,
would bringthousandsof hectaresunderprivatecommercialproduction.The
whileincludingsomeprojectsrunby individual
developmentplan forindustry,
state agencies, likewise was to provide public, deficit-financed
supportfor
investment
in
mediumto
This
private
large-scaleenterprises.
private-sector
approach is a product not simplyof the Bank's blueprint,forthe Bank also
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workswiththe PDRY, but also of the politicaland economicsituationin the
as thatof privateequipmentand
YAR.It definesthenationaleconomicinterest
native
neitherthe old
kulak
and
industrialists:
farmers,
machinery
importers,
landlords or the private financiersand consumer-goodsimportersof the
remittance-boom
era,buta productivecapitalistclass.
In the YAR, oil revenuescan be expectedto have a significantimpacton
in
domesticpolitics.The situationduringtheboomwas one ofcapitaldispersion,
whichthe privatesectortook initiativesindependentlyof the government's
theYemenishareof revenuesfromits oil
plansand even taxation.Conversely,
to
the
will
accrue
newly created Ministryof Oil and Mineral
production
be available to the stateitself,
Resources.This foreignexchangewill therefore
or to a "stateclass"managingpublicassets,to investin projectsas it sees fit.16
The resultshould be a morepowerfulstatemoreable to directthe economy
ofthebourgeoisiearoundmanagers
a reconfiguration
through
projectinitiatives,
of public assets, alliance of this class group with transnationalcorporate
and perhapsits clash withagrarianor otherinterests.In any case, it
interests,
morecomplex
a correspondingly
willbe a morecomplexclass situationentailing
seriesofquestionsregarding
autonomy.
NATIONALAND STATEAUTONOMY
CONCLUSIONS:
the cyclein
Fourpointsmaybe distilledfromthisaccount.Firstand foremost,
oil prices helped carry through the bourgeois revolution, that is, the
of state hegemonyand the
penetrationof capitalismand re-establishment
such
that
national
and
state
entailed,
autonomyare now issues.
they
struggles
into
world
its
markets
Second,although integration
necessarily
implieda loss of
in currencytransfers
was associated witha
earlierautonomy,the contraction
of nationalcontrolovertheallocationof resources.Thus,in
relativerestoration
the
1988,
prerequisitesfor either self-directedcapitalist development or
are in place.Third,thestateis moreautonomousfromitsclass base
dependency
ofa rising
thanitwas threedecadesago,butnow activelypromotestheinterests
of the nation.Finally,in recentexperiencethereseems to
class as theinterests
ofa tradeoff
betweennationaland stateautonomy,
havebeensomething
leading
to the questionof whetherthe YAR possesses sufficient
legal, financial,and
and absoluteautonomyfromdomestic
clouttoexercisebothhegemony
executive
interests.
and foreign
relianceon the sale of a single
One featureof dependencyis overwhelming
such
in the world
for
thatfluctuations
primarycommodity foreignexchange,
the
determine
or
recession
in
of
that
commodity
dependent
growth
price
economy.The YAR, exportingthe most primaryof all commodities,labor,
thisdependency
at secondhand.EconomicdemandforYemenilabor
experienced
to labor-short
in turndetermined
revenues
oil
Arabcountries,
was generatedby
forces
economic
far
and
intricate
far,
beyond Yemeni
by
global political
not
oil
the
the
YAR
was
an
influence.
producer, priceofoil was more
Although
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decisivefortrendsin GNP and nationalaccountsthanweredomesticagriculture
combined.
and industry
The Yemenislearnedthatgrowthdoes notnecessarily
fosterautonomy.Shorttermgrowthrealizedfrommassivelaborexportand foreignaid reducedrather
than enhanced economicand politicalindependence.The period of greatest
dependencybroughtdevelopment,ifdevelopmentis understoodas transition
fromprecapitalismto capitalism.Infrastructural
progressaccompaniedthe
of
new
over
commerce
a
coalition
autarkyand nationalist
emergence
favoring
over theocraticvalues. The fortunesof millionsof people became tied to the
marketplaceinstead of the weather.But the developmentwas dependentin
not
thatit was largelynon-productive
and externally
oriented,thusultimately
self-sustaining.
The strengthening
and then looseningof ties to the regionalcore actually
Yemen's
own core,centralizing
and economic
helped fortify
politicalauthority
control.In its thirddecade, theYAR's stateand newlyenrichedclasses enjoy
unprecedentedabilityto appropriateand allocateresourceswithina political
economy defined at the national level. Spending power that was widely
The periphery(workers,farmers,
dispersedis now increasinglyconcentrated.
consumers)now mustgo throughthecenter(thestate,majortradinghouses)to
get at theearnings(remittances,
profitsfromtrade)and resources(foreignaid,
for
could
be accesseddirectly.
local
that
The Yemeni
services)
funding
formerly
centerhas, in effect,bought internalhegemonywith externalpoliticaland
financialdebts,but is nonethelesssomewhatbetterable to allocateresourcesto
itsown developmentthana decade earlier.
Prospectsforrelativelyautonomousnationaldevelopmentmightwell be
overheadcan now
greaterthanbeforethebonanza,inasmuchas infrastructural
investment.
utilities
Roads
constructed
and
at the regional
supportproductive
and local level createda veryrudimentary
network
of services
yetwidespread
to supportagriculturaland even lightindustrialproductionforthe market,
ratherthan the concentration
of expendituresin one or two wealthyurban,
or
farm
areas
that
mining,
typifiesdeep structuraldependency. Foreign
in
the
is
At thesame time,thepreconditions
minimal.
for
ownership
economy
are
also
in
debts
the
national
and
external
deficits,
dependency
place:
intervention
intoplanningand management
and
theybring,an underemployed
domestic
labor
and
classes'
external
force,
underproductive
newlyprominent
orientations.
It is now correctto identifythe bourgeoisieas the dominantclass,but with
some qualification.First, vestiges of subsistence and tributarymodes of
thebourgeoisie
production
persistand maydo so forsometimeto come.Secondly,
is primarilya commercialclass whose ties to workershave heretofore
been
indirect:
to appropriateor accumulatethesurplusofYemenilabor,entrepreneurs
have to handle theirmoney,sell themgoods, or constructtheirhouses. While
or theeffects,
of
fairlylucrative,sellingservicesdoes nothave theconnotations,
In
there
no
direct
labor.
Marxist
is
relation
class
(or dynamic)
terms,
employing
betweenthebourgeoisieand workingpeople.
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Statepolicy,the interestsof the stateas it sees them,is to encouragethose
with privatecapital to use it to both employ and economize on labor in
As an American-school
comparativeadvantage-based
productiveenterprises.
model,it proposesto competitively
exportfruitsand vegetablesto financethe
of consumerand capitalgoods. This policy does not directlygo
importation
either
landowning or commercialinterests,but it is designed to
against
still
nascent industrialand agriculturalentrepreneursand, by
strengthen
of a properworkingclass. The statehas definedits
the
formation
association,
own interestsin conjunctionwithinvestorsin lightof domesticand foreign
ratherthanin responseto prodding
politicaland exchangefactors,therefore,
fromkulaks and industrialists.Concerned above all with its hegemony,
ideological, financial,and physical,the governmentseeks alliance with
nationalinterestsand will use state resourcesand
modern,entrepreneurial,
donorsto empowerthem.
assistancefromsympathetic
The theoreticalpoint underscored by the Yemeni case study is that
paradigmaticassumptionsabout nationaland state autonomy,whetherthe
are by definitionautonomousor the
mainstreamassertionthatnation-states
Third
World
lack autonomy,cannot
inference
that
all
governments
dependency
be made. Rather,nationaland stateautonomyare variables.Quite simply,this
meansthateach can takea rangeof values frompositiveto negative;thatthere
is no necessary association between the two; and that other variables,
in thiscase the worldpriceof petroleum,can be expectedto alter
specifically
of the state'srelationshipto outside powers and domestic
the configuration
classes.
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acrossnation-states;
1. Modernization
although
theory
compares
parallelhistories
andcontrol
ofthe
thelegitimacy,
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efficacy,
autonomy
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raisesmorequestions
globalhistory
and capitalaccumulation.
of thecorethanaboutinternal
classinterests
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